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This article is intended to stimulate discussion of ethical issues in-
volved in research in criminology and criminal justice. I will touch on
related issues bearing on the teaching of those subjects as well, for many
who face moral dilemmas in acquiring knowledge also face such dilem-
mas in attempting to impart knowledge.
Criminology is the systematic, scientific study of crime, criminals,
and society's reaction to both. The belief system of the canons of science
inheres in my reference to research. The acquisition of knowledge, for
its own sake or for some other utilitarian end, is achieved by means of
relatively detached and dispassionate perspectives. I suppose that in
Austin Turk's' terms, this approach is predominantly empirical, al-
though not necessarily devoid of or insensitive to the legal or polemical
definitions of reality. Applied in its common sense to the actions of the
professional researcher in criminology, the term "ethics" refers to the set
of principles governing conduct. I am applying that term to the profes-
sional researcher in criminology. Some of the issues I shall raise are also
issues in other disciplines of research and teaching; some are peculiarly
specific to criminology; all, I am asserting, are ethical issues. But some
observers may challenge their ethicality and claim instead that these
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Ethics, Public
Policy and Criminal Justice, Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware, Newark,
Delaware (Oct. 23-25, 1980).
** Director, Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Penn-
sylvania.
1 A. Turk, Legal, Polemical, and Empirical Definitions of Criminality (paper presented
at the Conference on Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, Center for the Study of
Values, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, Oct. 23, 1980).
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may be only dilemmas of decisions that have no right or wrong, good or
bad quality. I think they do, else I would not raise them.
The most common and classical issues have been addressed many
times in essays, in litigation, and in codes of ethics drawn up by profes-
sional organizations like the American Sociological Association and the
American Psychological Association, to which codes I shall refer later.
The classical issues relate to protection of human subjects, invasion of
privacy, confidentiality of records and interviews, accessibility to data,
and immunity of researchers from prosecution. I will expand on one or
two of these familiar issues and raise others that are less widely dis-
cussed.
II. RESEARCH STYLES
Research style raises a variety of classical ethical issues. Four epi-
sodes of court cases involving social scientists illustrate the serious issues
of legal protection of rights of investigators to protect their sources of
information and of immunity from being questioned by public agencies.
Case /.2 In November, 1972, Samuel Popkin, a Harvard political
scientist, became the first American scholar jailed for not revealing his
confidential sources of information about the unauthorized release of
the Pentagon Papers. When he declined to identify his sources to a fed-
eral grand jury before which he appeared for ten hours, he spent one
week in jail until the jury was dismissed.
Case 2. 3 A private research firm conducted a major social experi-
ment designed to measure the impact of various negative income tax
plans on labor force behavior and other activities of low income families
in New Jersey for the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).
Respondents filled out detailed questionnaires with information about
their income, expenditures, and living arrangements after researchers
had promised absolute confidentiality. The Mercer County prosecutor
subpoenaed the research firm to submit individual case records to ascer-
tain which recipients of federal aid programs had received illegal double
payments from New Jersey Welfare. A U.S. senator crusading against
welfare reform demanded individual files from researchers, and the
Government Accounting Office wanted the same for reanalysis of the
data. Researchers convinced some of these agencies that they did not
need identified case histories and substituted the aggregate data instead.
2 Nejelski & Finsterbusch, The Prosecutor and the Researcher Present and Prospective Variations
on the Supreme Court's Branzburg Decision, 21 SOC. PROB. 3 (1973).
3 Kershaw & Small, Data Confidentialiy and 1rivacy. Lessons faom the NewJersq Income Tar
Expenent, 20 PUB. POL'Y 257 (1972).
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Researchers had, however, no legal grounds for denying the requests if
the government agencies insisted on this information.
Case 3.4 A commission appointed by the Governor of New York to
investigate the riot and deaths which occurred at Attica Prison in 1971
interviewed thousands of witnesses under a pledge of confidentiality and
published its report. The New York State Attorney General's office,
which had been investigating criminal liability resulting from the riot,
issued a subpoena for the commission's complete records. A trial court
granted the commission's motion to quash the subpoena. However, in a
future criminal trial, another court might compel disclosure of a witness'
statements.
Case 1.5 Lewis Yablonsky, a criminologist/practitioner, while testi-
fying in defense of one of his main informants in his hippy study, was
asked by the judge nine times if he had witnessed the informant smoking
marijuana. Yablonsky refused to answer on fifth amendment grounds.
Although he was not legally sanctioned, he said the incident was humili-
ating and suggested that researchers should have guarantees of immu-
nity.
Along these same lines, I have a more personal example, fortu-
nately not one that has gone, or is likely to go, to court.6 Deinqueny in a
Birth Cohort7 was a study of approximately ten thousand boys born in
1945 who lived in Philadelphia from ages 10 to 18. No ethical problems
in collecting and analyzing data were encountered, for we had complete
cooperation from the Board of Education, the Archdiocese, and private
schools with regard to access to school records. Moreover, the Philadel-
phia Police Department and Selective Service granted us permission to
compare names and birthdates in order to determine which boys who
registered for selective service had a delinquency record.
In 1970 we obtained a research grant from the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) to study a ten percent sample of the birth co-
hort and to interview those members we could locate. After diligent
investigative work we located approximately sixty percent of the sample
and asked them questions requiring interviews of an hour or more.
None whom we found refused to be interviewed. We had no informed
consent form in those days. We asked many questions concerning their
4 Nejelski & Finsterbusch, supra note 2, at 4-5.
5 Irvin, Participant Observation of Criminals, in RESEARCH ON DEvIANCE 128-29 (J. Douglas
ed. 1972).
6 Wolfgang, Ethical Issouer o/Research in Criminology, in SOCIAL RESEARCH IN CONFLICT
WITH LAW AND ETHICS 25 (P. Nejelski ed. 1976). The account here is an abridged and
modified version.
7 M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972).
See also Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort, 117 PROC. AM. PHILO. Soc'y 404 (1973).
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education, occupation, family, military service, gang memberships, and
other personal history. Of special interest to us in analyzing their histo-
ries up to age twenty-six were self-reporting of both delinquencies prior
to age eighteen and crimes committed from ages eighteen to twenty-six.
We asked if they had committed any of thirty offenses before and after
age eighteen and whether the crimes they committed resulted in their
arrest.8
Many of the young men revealed to the interviewers that they had
committed a variety of crimes. This study did not mark the first use of
the self-report technique. 9 However, most previous studies in the
United States had drawn subjects from juniors and seniors in high
school who reported in mostly anonymous questionnaires or protected
interviews relatively innocuous juvenile status offenses such as stealing
from their mothers' pocketbooks, truancy, or petty larceny. Even the
relatively sophisticated studies conducted in Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden dealt mostly with petty offenses. The birth cohort follow-up in
Philadelphia explored a much wider range of criminal offense behavior,
including serious crimes such as robbery, burglary, rape, and even crimi-
nal homicide.
8 The questions related to the following offenses:
1. Been out past curfew.
2. Played hookey from school.
3. Run away from home.
4. Made an obscene phone call.
5. Hurt someone badly enough to require medical treatment.
6. Used heroin.
7. Taken a car for joyriding.
8. Disturbed the people in a neighborhood with loud noises.
9. Set off a fire alarm for the fun of it.
10. Threatened to hurt someone if he didn't give money or something else.
11. Taken some money from someone without his knowing it.
12. Had heroin in your possession.
13. Smoked pot.
14. Stolen something from a store.
15. Passed a bad check.
16. Forced a female to have sexual intercourse with you.
17. Broken into a residence, store, school, or other enclosed area.
18. Used a weapon to threaten another person.
19. Helped a girl to have an abortion.
20. Purposely damaged or destroyed property.
21. Gone to a house of prostitution.
22. Killed someone not accidentally.
23. Been drunk in public.
24. Carried a gun without a permit.
25. Carried a switch-blade or other big knife.
26. Had pot in your possession.
27. Hurt someone in a minor way, like knocking him down.
28. Bought or accepted property which you knew was stolen.
29. Had sexual intercourse before you were married.
30. Had sex relations with another male.
9 McClintock, The Dark Figure, in COLLECTED STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH
13-27, 31-34 (Council of Europe 1970).
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Many of the young men in the Philadelphia study revealed to the
interviewers that they had committed a variety of crimes. Four respon-
dents informed us that they had been involved in criminal homicide-
one before reaching eighteen-and seventy-five respondents claimed to
have committed forcible rapes. Neither these offenses nor the other less
serious admitted offenses resulted in any respondent's arrest.
There are several major ethical, scientific, and legal issues involved
in the collection of these offense data:'
0
A. SHOULD WE HAVE HAD WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT?
Each cohort member who was located for an interview generally
cooperated. Interviews were conducted in 1971, a period just prior to
the intensive concern for research using human subjects, prior to the
requirement of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that
research proposals contain forms about such research, before university
committees in research ethics were established, and before screening
commitees at HEW were functioning formally. Interviewers informed
members orally that responses would be strictly confidential, used only
for research purposes, and analyzed in the aggregate, with no single in-
dividual identified or identifiable in the final research report. We inter-
preted cooperation in replying to questions, many of which were
personal and sensitive, as consent to the uses we announced at the out-
set. Laws on privacy, informed consent, confidentiality, and accessibil-
ity to records were yet undeveloped. Nevertheless, there were sound
reasons against requesting written consent.
Consider the psychology of the interview. Although researchers
generally contacted cohort subjects first by mail or telephone, sometimes
initial contact was at the subject's front door. In that event had the
to As with the cohort study, a myriad of ethical problems arise with other styles of re-
search in deviance and crime. Participant observation in juvenile gang research may involve,
as it did for John Wise who worked for James Short and Fred Strodbeck in Chicago, direct
observations of delinquent and criminal activities followed by result tabulation and recorda-
tion. J. SHORT & F. STRODBECK, GROUP PROCESSES AND GANG DELINQUENCY (1965). In a
study soon to be published, Bernard Cohen observed, not as a participant, the street network
activity of heterosexual female prostitutes in about 30 street locations in New York City for
several years. He described his qualitative naturalistic ethnomethodology and then kept
count and blended in his quantitative analyses. He observed solicitations and other offenses,
but he contends that because observation took place only in public places, the acts would
have occurred whether or not he observed them from his car or some other post. He claims
that he did not intrude into the lives of his subjects and that he did not have an obligation to
'report offenses, despite his giving no one assurances of confidentiality. Nor did he obtain
informed consent to view the public performances of the prostitutes. B. COHEN, DEvLANT
STREET NETWORKS: PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK CrrY (1980). Under these circum-
stances, Cohen contends, he violated no ethical restraints of scientific inquiry. I think he is
right. Carl Klockars also experienced these dilemmas about disclosures of crimes that came
to his attention in The Pftresional Fence. C. KLOCKARS, THE PROFESSIONAL FENCE (1974).
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interviewer asked for written consent, the subject might have wished to
be more fully apprised of the mechanics and ultimate use of the inter-
view. For example, he could have asked to see the interview schedule.
Compliance with such a request would have nullified the advantages of
proceeding gradually from neutral to sensitive questions. It is impossi-
ble to know how many refusals such a process would have promoted.
Moreover, the form of the written consent could or could not have
contained reference to the refusal of the research staff to reveal informa-
tion to the police. We did not know then and still do not know whether
a court order could indeed impound the records, whether any member
of the staff who had access to specific information could suffer prosecu-
tion and imprisonment for protecting records, or whether any effort to
conceal data would be successful. Without the reference, the form
would have been inadequate and therefore misleading. With the refer-
ence, without admitting that one or more of these agencies might have
the authority to confiscate, or impound our records, the form again
would have been misleading. If the form admitted that justice authori-
ties could impound our records refusals to participate would have been
so abundant that the project would have been impossible. Either lies or
agnostic replies would have been the interviewees' responses to a variety
of hypothetical questions. The former would be unethical; the latter
would invite refusals to be interviewed.
On the other hand, the oral request for participation in a sociologi-
cal research maintained a minimum of formality, permitted the respon-
dent to refuse to answer any specific question (of course, a written
consent does not preclude specific question refusals), and permitted em-
ployment of the pretested question positioning intended to maximize
the likelihood of response. The result was rapport and cooperation.
B. SHOULD THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW BE PUBLISHED?
Our Center unequivocally supports publication of the results with
the protections announced in letters and orally by the interviewers. No
single individual will be identified or identifiable and all data will be
aggregated. Undeniably, publication in professional journals or books
produces a new layer of visibility of the research. Newspapers and other
media summarizing our earlier original birth cohort study thereby made
the police and courts aware of the character of the study. The same
certainly will occur with publication of the follow-up reporting not only
many of the personal, sociopsychological variables in the lives of cohort
members, but also the self-reported delinquencies and crimes. At that
point, police and other agencies could exert pressure on the research
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team" at the Center to reveal the names of those cohort members who
informed us of their crimes. The danger of publication would then be-
come a function of the degree to which threats of such pressure are real.
We still intend to publish, under the assumptions that (1) pressure
to disclose names is an unlikely event, and (2) our Center can effectively
function as a buffer between our research subjects and the acquisition of
our files by outside persons.
C. ARE MEMBERS OF THE RESEARCH STAFF ACCESSORIES AFTER THE
FACT?
Having obtained information about criminal offenses from identi-
fied subjects, the researchers stand in a posture of harboring informa-
tion, if not hiding individuals or abetting escape. The researcher does
not have the mantle of the clergy or of medical practitioners for protec-
tion. Probably the "crime," if any here, is misprision of a felony, which
is obsolete in most jurisdictions but still an offense under federal law.
The traditional research response to the charge of being an acces-
sory is that he or she is a neutral, disinterested recipient of data collected
only for scientific research purposes. The purpose for obtaining the in-
formation is to aid the scholarly enterprise and to provide guidance for a
rational social policy. Data obtained that could have direct untoward
consequences to subjects are not the possession of the state but of sci-
ence. Research is not designed to treat, help, or harm individual sub-
jects, and the social scientist is not a representative of any branch of
government with an obligation to execute certain police or judicial du-
ties. It may be argued that technically he ir, but the social definers do
not perceive or define him as such. The scientist might contend that he
is not even sure that the information given him is valid or correct; the
rebuttal is that it gives cause for official investigation.
D. ARE MEMBERS OF THE RESEARCH STAFF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE?
To the extent that notions of justice relate to the punishment of
offenders, anyone who has information about crimes and fails to report
it denies the system of justice its capacity to function relative to those
crimes and their perpetrators. Courts, however, generally construe ob-
struction of justice more narrowly and require obstruction of proceed-
ings actually pending, with specific intent to do so.
11 Researchers are not granted judicial protection based on the first amendment. In
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court rejected a reporter's privilege based on
that amendment. However, there are some narrow areas of protection, as in the case of re-
search on the effect and use of drugs, according to the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 872 (1970).
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Unwillingness to report reflects an uncompromising respect for the
conditions of scientific research that explicitly provide for confidential-
ity. Moreover, the research neither helps nor hinders the police and
prosecutory functions of society for were it not for the scientist's inquiry,
the information would not be available to authorities anyway.
E. IS THERE, NONETHELESS, AN OBLIGATION TO SOCIETY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO REPORT THIS KNOWLEDGE,
TRANSCENDING THE ETHICS OF CONFIDENTIALITY OR
THE INTERESTS OF SCIENCE?
Putting aside questions of legality, this question asks whether the
scientific researcher has broader moral responsibilities than his research
perimeters. Does the absence of written informed consent minimize the
impropriety of revealing criminal behavior by respondents, or would
revelation be ethically worse than not revealing the information? The
scientist may be viewed as ethically accountable only to the myopic lim-
its of his scientific vision. Over its long history, science has created codes
of conduct possessing deep traditions. Thus, in the Philadelphia study
the scientist values protecting the individual used for his research above
the interests of capture for criminal justice. Society until now has gener-
ally permitted the scientist his priority allocation. Again, the scientist
seeks neither to help nor harm the individual respondent per se, nor to
help nor hinder the criminal justice system. His role is neither benevo-
lent nor malevolent.
If a medical laboratory research project unrelated to cancer re-
search inadvertently discovered that a volunteer subject had cancer, the
researcher might feel rightly obligated to inform the subject, because
such information might save a diseased person's life. Many other exam-
ples are imaginable in which revelations to the research subject and to
others could have beneficial effects. Is it conceivable that a piece of in-
formation about a research subject may be discovered that would be
harmful to him but of considerable benefit to many others? If so, no
such situations exist in the criminological research under discussion. It
may be said that if any researcher doubts the moral obligation to main-
tain confidentiality, he should abstain from this kind of research. He
would thereby satisfy his sense of ethics that lie outside the framework of
those of science.
F. WHAT SHOULD A RESEARCH CENTER DO IF THE POLICE,
PROSECUTOR, OR COURT REQUESTS THE FILES?
Our position is clear: we would not honor the request. We would
make every effort, short of using aggressive force, to prevent the files
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from being examined or taken from the Center's premises. We would, if
necessary, enter into litigation to protect the confidentiality of the
records. There is no United States Supreme Court case affirming or
rejecting this position.
Even if the staff is not viewed as accessory after the fact or as ob-
structing justice for refusing to identify subjects, a court may still hold
staff members in contempt if they do not submit the files to examination
or impounding upon a court order. Whether a research staff is immune
from contempt remains undecided in the caselaw. Nevertheless, were
our Center's staff declared by the courts as not immune from prosecu-
tion, we would still maintain a posture of unwillingness to reveal names.
G. CAN A RESEARCH STAFF DEVELOP A TECHNIQUE THAT CAN
PROVIDE A FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION AGAINST IDENTIFICATION
OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS IN A RESEARCH FILE?
There are techniques that surely would delay, if not forever pre-
vent, subject identification. Researchers might use computer tapes on
cards that show only identification numbers representing names for the
file that is to be analyzed statistically in the aggregate.' 2 Number-name
combinations might be on a separate computer tape which can be de-
posited in a bank account in a foreign country where accounts are se-
cret. Although no law prohibits this procedure, the account owner (in
our example the Center) may still be subject to charges of contempt for
failing to produce the tape.'3 Nevertheless, considering the paramount
purpose of confidentiality, such a process is both pragmatically expedi-
ent and ethical. However researchers decide to catalogue their data, in
studies such as that conducted in Philadelphia they should not record
the names of victims or other identifying facts about specific crimes un-
less absolutely essential for the research. Without such details, the files
are less useful to law-enforcement officials.' 4
12 This suggestion was made in Blumstein, Science and Technologv, in TASK FORCE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE (1967).
13 Similar issues have been raised in Wolfgang, The Social &ientit in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L.
& C. 239 (1974).
14 Recently, the Northern District of California stressed the need to preserve confidential-
ity in Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal.
1976). Plaintiff, seeking final payment for delivery of 135 spray cooling modules for use in
one of the gas company's power plants, brought an action for breach of contract against
Pacific, which withheld final payment because the spray modules allegedly did not perform
as guaranteed. Plaintiff deposed a professor who, under a pledge of confidentiality, had inter-
viewed employees of the gas company as part of a research project which involved inquiring
into the decision to install the spray cooling facility. On the advice of counsel, the professor,
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III. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS
Another ethical issue pertains to the issuance of public or social pol-
icy statements. Increasingly, public decisionmakers are listening to so-
cial scientists in general and criminologists in particular. Even if these
officials do not always take our advice, they often request our testimony.
The efficacy of such testimony is unclear. Having been involved in some
of these dramas, I have felt keenly the pressure of considering the ethics
of presenting scientific evidence vulnerable to criticism before bodies
that intend to act on the testimony. Scientific evidence is presentable in
a relatively bland, descriptive fashion without explicit leaps to interpre-
tation beyond the data. Absent interpretation, however, an audience
usually will receive the data in ways that conform to their own predilec-
tions. If the researcher offers his own conclusions, he should do so with a
clearance to his conscience that he has done his best work with the avail-
able material at his command. If the testimony bears on social policy,
the researcher must struggle with determining when a Sumnerian (Wil-
liam Graham Sumner) description moves to a Wardian (Lester F.
Ward) prescription.
The scientific issues of reliability and validity can reach the thresh-
old of an ethical issue when statements relating to crime and punish-
ment could affect the lives of many thousands of persons: how many
replications of one good study are required for firm prescriptive conclu-
siveness? This and similar questions continue to disturb the scientific
community, especially in light of conflicting and contradictory findings
on such topics as deterrence, incapacitation, plea bargaining, and the
death penalty. If one has a posture on a particular policy issue and the
scientific evidence is equivocal, should the researcher avoid offers to tes-
tify? Is self-imposed silence an ethically acceptable position to science?
I think not, even if there is fear that the presentation of findings may be
abusively employed or distorted in interpretation by others.
Allow me again to give an example from my own research experi-
ence on the topics of race, rape, and the death penalty. Science deals
with probabilities, not certainties. At what point a probability state-
and later his research assistant, refused to disclose either the identity of the gas company
employees interviewed or the content of the interviews.
According to the court, the issue was "whether on these facts, plaintiff's interest in satis-
fying its discovery request outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidential relation-
ships between academic researchers and their sources." Id. at 389. Noting that neither the
professor nor his assistant were parties to the proceeding, that they initiated their research
with no view to this litigation, that the central subject of the litigation was not central to the
study, and that factual issues dividing the parties were resolvable without recourse to state-
ments of the gas company employees, the court stated that "[c]ompelled disclosure of confi-
dential information would without question stifle research into questions of public policy, the
very subjects in which the public interest is the greatest." Id. at 390.
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ment can become-morally prescriptive is not clear, despite our reliance
on tests of statistical significance. In one instance research was per-
formed to determine whether there was dirential sentencing based on
race of the offender and victim. When the carefully collected data re-
vealed differential treatment by race, I finally concluded in official judi-
cial testimony that such a differential was inferentially diLcrminatoy.
The difference between these two terms--"differential" and "discrimi-
natory"-signified a prescriptive leap.' 5
Most people's attitudes about the death penalty rest fundamentally
upon one or more ethical assertions. Teachings from social or behav-
ioral science may be a factor in these determinations, but research from
these disciplines is often selectively used to buttress pre-existing beliefs
and moral postures. The judiciary, especially at the federal level, has
increasingly admitted social science research in testimony by expert wit-
nesses and in Supreme Court briefs.
Over ten years ago, Michael Finkelstein traced the history of judi-
cial reasoning in jury discrimination cases and showed that for some
time the Supreme Court had been reasoning according to its intuition of
probabilities.' 6 Finkelstein argued that statistical support should re-
place intuition in judicial reasoning. The Court later cited him in its
Whitus v. Georgia 17 decision which, as de Cani noted,"' marked the be-
ginning of the Court's "willingness to listen to a probabilistic argument
that the group from which the jury was chosen was not a representative
cross-section of the community."
My own initial involvement in the presentation of social science
research was in the Maxwell v. Birhop' 9 case in the Arkansas district
court, which involved a black convicted of raping a white and sentenced
to death. Research had demonstrated that out of twenty-eight legal and
extralegal variables concerned with the offense of rape, the offender, and
the victim, the only variable that emerged as overwhelmingly statisti-
cally significant was that of blacks raping whites, relative to the sentence
of death. Now, permit me to refer to my previous account:
I was asked under cross-examination if I had ever been in Arkansas
before my appearance as an expert witness for the Legal Defense Fund. I
15 Some of the following has been adapted from my article, The Death Penalty: SocialPhios-
ophy and Social Science Research, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1978).
16 Finkelstein, Application of Statistical Decision Teory to the Juy Discrimination Cases, 80
HARv. L. Rav. 338 (1966).
17 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1966).
18 de Cani, Statistical Evidence in jug, Discrimination Cases, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 234, 235
(1974).
19 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966), denial of appeal reo'd and remanded per curiam, 385 U.S.
650 (1967), aj'd, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remandedper curiam, 398 U.S. 262
(1970).
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responded in the negative. The Assistant Attorney General used this re-
ponse to imply that I did not fully understand the social conditions or the
litigation processes in Arkansas. It was further brought out under cross-
examination that Garland County, in which Maxwell had been tried, was
not included in the survey sampling of Arkansas counties. The state ar-
gued that failure to include Garland County was a fatal error, that the
generalized conclusions drawn from the Arkansas rape-death penalty
study could not apply to the Maxwell case.
Based upon my research, this conclusion was absurd. We had taken a
carefully drawn random sample of counties in Arkansas, as well as in the
other ten Southern states, without attention to the counties in which spe-
cific cases for litigation may finally occur. Our primary interest had been
to determine whether there had been a customary, institutionalized, sys-
tematic process of differential sentencing to the death penalty based on
race; hence, the specific litigated cases were of no consequence to our ran-
dom selection. If we had drawn our sample counties purposefully to pick
counties in which cases like Maxwell had occurred, we would have de-
stroyed the statistical randomness of the selection of counties and would
also have distorted the character of the scientific inquiry. Yet, this fact
and this kind of reasoning had little impact on either Assistant Attorney
General Fletcher Jackson or Judge J. Smith Henley.
The social scientist who becomes involved in testifying and displaying
research evidence must also be prepared for opinions that contravene the
traditional specific canons of response. For example, Judge Henley ac-
cepted my conclusion that sentencing patterns of Arkansas Negroes con-
victed of raping white victims "could not be due to the operation of the
laws of chance." He accepted the conclusion that a black convicted of
raping a white woman had about a 50 per cent chance of receiving a death
sentence, and that any man convicted of raping a woman of his own race
stood only a 14 per cent chance. But Judge Henley thought the difference
could be explained on grounds other than race, and contended that the
imposition of the death sentence might be due to some factor for which
statistical analysis had not been possible or presentable. He announced in
his decision that the "variables which Dr. Wolfgang considered are objec-
tive. . . broad in instances. . . imprecise. . . .Discrimination moreover
is a highly subjective matter [and might not] be detected by a statistical
analysis . . . .Statistics are elusive things at best, and it is a truism that
almost anything can be proven by them." These are common assertions
made by persons who are not social scientists trained in statistics. Yet, the
social scientist who becomes involved in testifying in this area must be
prepared for arguments and decisions that are political or that reside in
legal vicissitudes outside the framework of social science inquiry and evi-
dence.
20
Upholding the conviction in Maxwell, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 2' acknowledged the extensive and sophis-
ticated research, yet concluded that "nothing has been presented in
Maxwell's case which convinces us, op causes us to seriously wonder,
20 Wolfgang, supra note 13, at 244.
21 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
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that, with the imposition of the death penalty, he was the victim of dis-
crimination based on race." The court's resistance to social science re-
search is blatant:
Whatever value [the statistical] argument may have as an instrument of
social concern, whatever suspicion it may arouse with respect to southern
interracial rape trials as a group over a longer period of time, and
whatever it may disclose with respect to other localities, we feel that the
statistical argument does nothing to destroy the integrity of Maxwell's
trial. Although the investigation and study made by Professor Wolfgang
in the summer of 1965 is interesting and provocative, we do not, on the
basis of that study, upset Maxwell's conviction and, as a necessary conse-
quence, cast serious doubt on every other rape conviction in the state
courts of Arkansas.
22
The court was unwilling both to accuse a state of discriminatory
conduct in sentencing proportionately more blacks than whites to the
death penalty over a twenty-year period and to acknowledge that Max-
well may have been a victim of such a practice, despite its statement
that "we do not say that there is no ground for suspicion that the death
penalty for rape may have been discriminatorily applied over the dec-
ades in that large area of states whose statutes provide for it. There are
recognizable indicators of this."'23 Michael Meltsner recounted in his
book Cruel and Unusual that "if race were not related to capital sentenc-
ing in Arkansas, the results observed in the twenty-year period study
could have occurred fortuitously in two (or less) twenty-year periods
since the birth of Christ. '24 Juxtapose this statement against the court's
use of such phrases as "we do not say that there is no ground for suspi-
cion" and "there are recognizable indicators." How different the lan-
guage of science and the court! A probability of 0.02 becomes
"recognizable indicators."
Although recognizing social science research in its 1976 death pen-
alty decisions, the Supreme Court was careful to minimize its use.25 As
22 Id. at 148.
23 Id. at 147.
24 M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 100-01 (1973).
25 As Meltsner also shows, the Supreme Court reflected an increasing receptivity to social
science research in the Furman decision. The basis for inferring cruel and unusual punishment
in the imposition of the death penalty hinged on the interpretation and relationship between
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Both Justices Douglas and Marshall accepted the
social science research that showed discriminaton in the imposition of the death penalty. But
in the brief before the Supreme Court in the Fowler case in 1974, Solicitor General Robert
Bork inserted the following statement about research: "In any event, we do not think that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment should turn on the results of the latest social science
research." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 37 n.13, Fowler v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 904 (1976).
Moreover, the abundance of research on deterrence introduced to the Court has resulted
in no definite judicial conclusionary statements. The testimony of Thorsten Sellin that the
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Hugo Bedau noted:
One of the most galling features of the Gregg, Projitt, and jurek decisions is
the way the court reacted, or rather failed to react, to the social science
research published in the years since Furman. With perhaps one exception,
the court passed it by without significant acknowledgement, discussion, or
rebuttal. This was especially conspicuous in the Gregg ruling. . . .For so-
cial scientists and jurists who had expected that this round of death pen-
alty cases would find the Supreme Court resting its decision, at least in
part, on the results of careful and relevant empirical investigations, the
Gregg decision can be viewed only as a bitter disappointment. Four years
ago, in his dissent in Furman, Chief Justice Burger complained of the 'pau-
city' of evidence relied on by the majority ruling in favor of abolition. This
year's ruling in Gregg rests on even less.
2 6
Until the Supreme Court can come to grips with probabilistic and
inferential statistics, intuitive, clinical, and vague judgments will con-
tinue, as will ethical decisions.
IV. EVALUATION RESEARCH AND THE P < .05
Norval Morris raised an interesting question about the "burglar's
nightmare. '27 We ordinarily think of random representative samples or
assignments as scientifically acceptable, even ethically proper. But sup-
pose burglars alike in all important particulars were assigned randomly
to experimental and control groups, the experimentals to be released six
months or a year earlier than they ordinarily would be and the controls
at their regularly appointed time. How would the burglar assigned to
the control group respond? He could say that it is unjust and unethical
to be put into the control group and that he deserves to be released early
also. Can science, for the sake of determining whether early release pro-
death penalty has no ascertainable deterrent effect led to its abolition in England. Isaac
Ehrlich's econometric analyses, suggesting that eight lives were saved by such execution was
quickly challenged by a series of other econometric studies that denied the correlation be-
tween executions and the homicide rates. See Bailey, Murder and CapitalPunihment, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCH. 669 (1975); Bailey, Rape andthe Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 336 (Bedau & Pierce eds. 1976); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of
Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Efect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE LJ. 170
(1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment,
85 YALE LJ. 187 (1975); Forst, The Deterrent Eect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of
the 1960s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1977); Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy, in CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (Bedau & Pierce eds. 1976); Peck, The Deterrent
Effect of CapitalPunishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164, 359 (1975-76); B. Forst, V. Filator & L. Klein,
The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment (unpublished manuscript).
A recent panel of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences
has carefully reviewed the literature on deterrence and provided new models of analysis. As
mentioned earlier, the panel concludes that the evidence is currently inconclusive because of
the inadequacy of the data.
26 Bedau, New Lift for the Death Penalty, 223 NATION 144, 146-47 (1976).
27 Morris, Punishment, Desert, and Rehabilitation, in EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 137 (U.S.
Dep't Justice 1976).
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duces no more recidivism, justify retention of some subjects in prison?
The burglar says no, the scientist says yes.
Evaluation research presents a whole series of ethical issues, far
more than we can explore here. But there is at least one overriding
commentary I wish to make. Scientists and researchers have an ethical
obligation to know about the most robust and sophisticated research
techniques available, else their findings may be faulty and fall far short
of a conclusion on the basis of the best available evidence. The newest
and most complex techniques are not always applicable to certain kinds
of data; hence, the researcher should seek to fit his analyses to the quali-
ty of his material. Moreover, as probability statistics have become in-
creasingly admitted into litigation both in civil and criminal
proceedings, some judges have come to accept the P value of .05 as
nearly sacred in determining what is acceptable and what is unaccept-
able science. Neither scientists nor judges should be so rigorously wed-
ded to the notion of .05 to ignore consistent patterns and trends of P
values a bit more than .05. The ethics of our findings are not bound by
an invariable obedience to such limited notions of reality.
V. RESEARCH FUNDS
The source of research funds may not pose a moral dilemma for
many recipients. Nevertheless pressure to adopt unpalatable sugges-
tions, unmanageable time constraints, or politicization of the funding
agency may put into question the ethics of accepting funds from that
source. It is unlikely that the researcher will seek or accept funds from a
group whose views he considers unacceptable or intolerable, irrespective
of the imposition of those views on the research.
Some researchers would not accept funds from major corporations
because of presumed unethical practices in the acquisition of wealth.
Others, opposing the power of government, may likewise refuse govern-
ment funds for research, however free from interference in the research.
In either case the danger of manipulation of research findings by the
funding agency often provides an additional disincentive to accepting
research funds. Where the agency does impose its views on the research;
say by conditioning publication of results on their conformity with the
agency's views, the scientist who values freedom of publication and sci-
entific inquiry prostitutes his integrity by accepting such conditions.
Recognizing the possibility that research will facilitate the misuse of
power in both the private and public spheres, the Code of Ethics of the
American Sociological Association affirm[s] the autonomy of sociologi-
cal inquiry.
The sociologist must be responsive, first and foremost, to the truth of his
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investigation. Sociology must not be an instrument of any person or group
which seeks to suppress or misuse knowledge. The fate of sociology as a
science is dependent upon the fate of free inquiry in an open society.2 8
VI. TEACHING CRIMINOLOGY
I am indebted to Professor Jerome Hall for the provocative sugges-
tion that it is ethically good and sound for a criminology professor to
disclose to new students his ideological preferences within the subject
matter to be discussed. Such disclosures permit the students to take
those perspectives into account when digesting hypotheses, findings, and
interpretations offered by the professor. An instructor controls the inter-
active dynamics of the classroom through the choice of topics, selection
of readings, and the approaching and concluding of a topic. I should
think that topics such as free will and determinism, consensus versus
conflict, correctional treatment versus retribution, and the just deserts
model and others are proper candidates for the presentation of one's
perspectives. Whether the perspectives are based on the best available
scientific evidence may be of some consequence; but, however they are
derived, teachers should display them explicitly. Scientists and teachers
in other disciplines such as astronomy, biology, and even mathematics
must sense this same disclosure obligation. But in criminology and
criminal justice, where the law, ethics, and science converge on so many
topics, disclosure is vital.
Revealing personal biases in a textbook may fulfill a teacher's obli-
gation to disclose. But can a professor ethically require his own students
to purchase the textbook? The book is, after all, nothing more than the
written, usually more elegant and comprehensive, presentation of the
professor's learning. Arguably, the process of putting such a book to-
gether is itself a claim that the book is the best in the field. Moreover,
students need not elect to take the course. Therefore, requiring its
purchase is reasonable and logical. To further insulate the ethical pro-
priety of requiring one's own textbook, the professor might divest him-
self of the royalties and thereby reduce the cost to students.
VII. CONCLUSION
I conclude by referring to a reply by Professor Stephen J. Morse to
Judge Bazelon's argument for more welfare programs in order to reduce
poverty and ultimately crime. Professor Morse argues against what he
calls "welfare criminology" and for a firm sentencing policy in criminal
justice. He raises a number of ethical issues:
Is it immoral to ask that the cost of reducing crime be borne by the mor-
28 Toward a Code of Ethics for Sociologists, 3 AM. Soc. 316, 318 (1968).
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ally responsible agents who have been convicted of crimes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, rather than by innocent persons? If mandatory sentences
of humane duration significantly reduce the crime rate (in contrast to pov-
erty programs which have not done so), can it reasonably be claimed that
such a program is amoral or immoral? To be sure, we cannot be certain
which would be more effective, increased social welfare or criminal justice
reform. But given this uncertainty and the past failures of social justice
solutions, it does seem clear the social justice adherent is not entitled to
claim that his position is the moral one, and that alternative analyses and
suggestions are immoral.
29
The Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Crminal
Justice System speaks eloquently about the reasons for the importance of
ethics in this field:
While other institutions, such as mental hospitals, also restrict individual
freedom, the criminal justice system is the principal locus of legitimate
force in American society. The consequences of its misapplication may be
severe and irreversible. An additional reason for placing a high priority on
ethical consensus in criminal justice is that the people processed by that
system are likely to be poor or minorities and thus to have little access to
conventional means for redressing their grievances.
3 0
Scientific research and ethics are interrelated, especially in criminal
justice. Ethical decisions are made and changed based on subjective
perceptions of good and evil, right and wrong. Changes in science are
mostly cumulative and, within the sustained value system of the canons
of science, change is improvement in the understanding and the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. When ethics and science intersect, the historical mo-
ment is important. For when the qualitative difference of our ethics
meets the quantitative maturation of our science, each impinges on the
other in ways that require constantly new interpretations. The ethical
issues of justice today are little different from those raised by Plato, Aris-
totle, Kant, and others. The science of today is little understood by a
demographic generation removed from today. To mesh the two is our
perennial problem.
29 Morse, The Twilight of Wefare Criminolog: A Reply to Judge Baze/on, 49 S. CAL. L. REv.
1249, 1265 (1976).
30 Report of the Task Force on the Role of Pschology in the Ciminalfustice System, 33 AM. PSYCH.
1099, 1100 (1978).
